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Over  the  last  two  decades,  virtually  every  western  European  nation  has  faced  high  and 
persistent  unemployment.  In frustration,  many  Europeans  have  looked  to  the  United  States,  with 
its lower  unemployment  rates,  as a model  of labor  market  flexibility.  The  U.S.  model  has  become 
less  attractive,  however,  as analysts  have  come  to  recognize  the  extent  of  rising  wage  inequality  in 
the  United  States  over  the  past  two  decades,  including  sharp  declines  in wages  among  the  less 
skilled.  In  short,  both  European  countries  and  the  United  States  have  faced  serious  labor  market 
problems  in recent  years. 
This  article  discusses  some  of the  ways  in which  these  labor  market  problems  on  either 
side  of the  Atlantic  reflect  different  institutional  responses  to  related  economic  problems.  Both 
the  U.S.  and  the  European  experiences  demonstrate  that  there  are  no  easy  answers  about  how  to 
operate  a labor  market  which  generates  plenty  ofjobs  for  younger  and  less-skilled  workers  and 
which  also  offers  these  workers  the  opportunity  to  earn  enough  to  support  a family.  Good  policy  , 
choices  will  require  mixing  some  of the  best  aspects  of labor  market  flexibility  with  well-run 
activist  labor  market  and  social  protection  policies. 
This  is not just  an economic  concern.  The  labor  market  problems  experienced  on  both 
sides  of the  Atlantic  have  had  a number  of social  and  political  ramifications.  These  labor  market 
changes  test  a country’s  social  cohesion  and  its sense  of community.  Those  who  have  lost 
economically  over  the  past  few  decades  -- either  because  of extended  unemployment  or  because 
of falling  wages  -- are likely  to  be more  conservative  and  less willing  to  take  risks.  Rising 
opposition  to  immigrants  and  various  forms  of right-wing  violence  is on  the  rise  in both  the 
United  States  and  Europe.  Many  countries  are experiencing  difficulties  in maintaining  a sense  of 
community  and  civic  conversation  between  those  who  are  angry  at their  losses  and  those  who 2 
have  maintained  (or  gained  in) relative  economic  status  over  the  past  decade.  While  the  sources 
of this  discontent  may  not  be  solely  economic,  the  employment  problems  faced  by  specific  groups 
of workers  in all these  countries  are  one  potentially  important  source  of anger. 
The  Story  in Europe 
Concurrent  with  the  OPEC  oil price  shocks  and  a world-wide  recession,  European  nations 
experienced  sharp  rises  in unemployment  and  a slow-down  in growth  in the  mid-1970s.  Rather 
than  recovering  in the  1980s  in many  European  nations  things  got  worse.  Unemployment  was 
higher  by  1990  than  it had  been  in  1980  for  most  countries,  and  these  high  unemployment  rates 
continue  to  persist,  as figure  1 indicates.  Rates  of long-term  unemployment  (the  share  of the 
unemployed  out  of work  12 months  or more)  soared  to  between  30 and  50 percent  in many 
nations,  while  part-time  employment  also  rose.’  Problems  were  especially  severe  among  younger 
workers. 
Initial  attempts  to  explain  this  high  unemployment  focused  on  the  lack  of  labor  market 
flexibility  in Europe,  due  to  extensive  labor  market  regulation  and  generous  social  assistance 
programs.  Despite  an uncertain  economy,  it was  argued,  wages  stayed  high  because  of  protective 
legislation  and  rigid  union  rules.  Employers  refused  to  hire  these  high-cost  workers,  especially 
since  extensive  severance  protection  made  it costly  or impossible  to  lay them  off.  Workers,  in 
turn,  were  content  to  remain  out  of the  work  force  because  they  received  generous  and  long-term 
unemployment  compensation  and  other  assistance.* 
’  See  Table  2 of Blank  (1995). 
* For  example,  see the  collections  of articles  in Bean  et.  al. (1987)  or Lawrence  and 
Schultze  (1987). 3 
As  high  unemployment  persisted  through  the  198Os, these  stories  about  economic 
inflexibility  were  buttressed  with  other  explanations  that  focused  on  the  persistence  of  such 
problems.  Insider/outsider  models  suggested  that  the  workers  who  remained  employed  had  no 
incentive  to  allow  flexible  wages  and  severance  rules,  hence  “insiders”  (the  employed)  kept  firms 
from  adjusting  in ways  that  would  allow  them  to  hire “outsiders”  (the  unemployed.)  Similarly, 
various  so-called  “hysteresis”  models  tried  to  explain  how  the  European  nations  moved  from  a 
low-unemployment  to  a high-unemployment  equilibrium  because  of  a series  of  sustained 
economic  shocks  in the  1970s  and  early  1980s3 
Over  the  198Os, many  European  nations  tried  to  create  greater  flexibility  in their  labor 
markets  by weakening  protective  legislation,  in the  hope  this  would  bring  unemployment  rates 
down.  For  instance,  Germany,  France,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Belgium  weakened  their 
dismissal  laws.  Spain,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  Netherlands  decentralized  wage  bargaining. 
Italy  eliminated  automatic  wage  indexation.4  The  Ml  list of such  efforts  is long. 
Surprisingly,  as researchers  studied  these  changes  they  found  remarkably  few  effects. 
Certainly  aggregate  unemployment  rates  did  not  fall noticeably.  In  1991-93,  I headed  a research 
project  sponsored  by the  Ford  Foundation  and  the  National  Bureau  of Economic  Research  that 
commissioned  a group  of U.S.  and  European  authors  to  study  the  effect  of European  changes  in 
labor  market  regulation  and  social  protection  on  labor  market  flexibility.’  This  research  indicated 
3 For  instance,  see the  discussion  in Lindbeck  and  Snower  (1990)  or Blanchard’s  article  in 
Dreze  and  Bean  (1990). 
4 Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (1990.) 
’ Blank  (1994) 4 
that the effects of these changes were small.  For instance, changes in severance  laws or in public 
sector bargaining,  created  no bursts ofjob  growth  or worker  mobility.  These results  are 
consistent  with work by other  researchers, who at best find very small effects from the efforts  of 
European  nations  to free up labor market constraints6 
It is possible that the legislative changes enacted by European  nations  in the  1980s were 
too  small to make a difference,  and that larger more dramatic changes are necessary.  For 
instance,  rather than limiting severance pay and making it easier to fire workers,  perhaps  nations 
need to abolish all such laws entirely.  But the small effect of efforts by European  countries  to 
create more flexible labor markets  suggests that the problems facing Europe’s  labor markets  go 
beyond  the institutional  structures  and rules that exist within these countries. 
The  Story  in  the  United  States 
Through  the mid-l 98Os, the much less regulated labor markets  in the United  States 
appeared  to provide  a successful alternative  model.  While unemployment  continued  to rise in 
Europe  through  the  198Os, it fell dramatically  in the United  States  By the late  1980s  it was at a 
low and sustained  rate of around  S-1/2 percent, as figure  1 shows.  The mild recession  of  1990-91 
pushed unemployment  up, but it fell quickly to its previous low levels by the mid-1990s. 
By the late  198Os,  however,  a number of economic  observers began to suggest  that 
focusing  only on unemployment  missed an important  piece of the U.S. picture.  While 
unemployment  seemed stable at fairly low levels, wage inequality was rising rapidly.  Real wages 
of less-skilled workers  have fallen steadily since the early 1970s.  Between  1979 and  1993, real 
6 For instance,  see Blanchflower  and Freeman (1993), Atkinson  and Mogensen  (1993)  or 
Buechtemann  (1993). 5 
wages (wages adjusted  for inflation)  among men working  full-time without  a high school  degree 
fell 22 percent,  while full-time working  men with a high school degree experienced  a 12 percent 
decline in their wages.  Over these same years, C.&time male workers  with a college  degree  saw 
their wages rise by 10 percent.  Female workers  have also seen dramatic increases  in wage 
inequality,  although  the actual declines among the least skilled are not as extreme  (not a very 
reassuring  statement  given how low wages for less-skilled women have always been.)7 
The slow realization  of these wage trends underscores  the effect of data on the public 
policy discussion.  The unemployment  rate is reported  monthly in many countries,  and it  is widely 
discussed and accepted  as a measure of economic  pain.  In contrast,  distributional  issues are rarely 
measured nor reported  in official government  statistics.  While average wage and income  levels 
are frequently  reported,  distributional  changes around that average are not.  Hence,  it was not 
until the early  1990s that these wage trends became known and accepted.  Only after a number of 
studies by different  researchers  with different data sets all produced  similar evidence  of declining 
wages at the bottom  and rising wages at the top, did this rise in inequality become  an accepted 
fact within the academic community.  By the time the wage inequality  information  became widely 
accepted,  the claim that flexible American labor markets were obviously  superior  to Eurosclerotic 
labor markets  had become  so imbedded in the public discussion, that few people  stopped  to 
reassess whether  that flexibility came at too high a price. 
In short, while the less-regulated  U.S. labor markets appear to have avoided  serious 
unemployment  problems, they instead experienced major declines in wages for some groups  of 
7 The data on wage changes are from Blank (1997).  For discussion  of the changes  in 
wage inequality,  see Levy and Mumane  (1992) or Danziger and Gottschalk  (1995). 6 
workers.  The bottom  line is that I_x& the United States and Europe  have faced major and 
problematic  labor market  changes over the past two decades.  Although  the trends  in U.S. wage 
inequality  were much less immediately visible and only became apparent  over time, the problems 
that they create  for less-skilled workers  may be as severe as the problems faced by European 
workers  who experience  long spells of unemployment. 
A “Unified  Theory”  of Links Between U.S. and European  Labor Market  Problems? 
Increasingly,  researchers  are looking  at the potential  links between  rising inequality  in the 
United  States and high unemployment  in Europe.  The same changing global economic  forces  are 
impacting both the United  States and Europe.  For instance, changing patterns  of international 
trade  and changing technologies  will increase the demand for some groups  (especially  more 
skilled workers),  while decreasing the demand for other groups (especially less skilled workers)  in 
all industrialized  nations.  In the more open U.S. labor markets, it is not be surprising if these 
changes produce  shifts in relative wages.  The more regulated European  labor markets  have 
historically  maintained  more rigid wage structures,  forcing employers to adjust to these economic 
changes by changing  their hiring and firing behavior, leading to increased unemployment.  A 
priori, it is not clear whether  the United  States or the European  model is preferable.  They are 
simply different,  adjusting to these international  economic  changes in different ways, with 
different effects on various groups  of workers. 
Let’s call this story the “unified theory,”  since it suggests both the European  and U.S. 
labor market  problems  are the result of the same fundamental changes in global  economic  forces. 
The best evidence  in support  of this theory  is simply the timing of events.  Continuing  high 
unemployment  in Europe  became a puzzle as the world economy  started to recover  in the late 7 
1970s.’  This is exactly the same time that wage inequality started to rise rapidly in the United 
States.  Both  sets of problems appeared to emerge at about the same time, although  the wage 
inequality  problems in the United  States were not widely recognized  until almost  a decade  later. 
But other  empirical evidence for the unified.theory  is admittedly  mixed.  The careful  cross- 
national  research  needed to fully explore this issue is only beginning.  The theory  implies a trade- 
off between  wage inequality  and high unemployment,  where countries  with the most inflexible 
labor markets  experience  the highest unemployment  rates but show little evidence  of rising wage 
inequality,  and vice versa.  At best, the reverse correlation  between these two problems  across 
countries  appears mild.  The United States has experienced the strongest  increase  in wage 
inequality,  and little long-term  increase in unemployment  rates over the past  15 years,  consistent 
with the theory.  Similarly, some European  countries with high unemployment  show no change in 
wage inequality.  But, some European  countries  have experienced both problems,  most notably 
the United Kingdom.’ 
Further  evidence  might be found by investigating  which group  of workers 
the biggest  decline in relative wages in the United States, and asking whether  this 
are experiencing 
same group  of 
workers  is most affected by rising unemployment  in European  countries.  In the United  States,  it 
is clearly the less skilled who have seen the biggest wage declines, although  wage inequality  is 
rising within  skill categories  as well.  In Europe,  unemployment  rates are highest  among the least 
skilled, but it is not clear that the relative unemployment  rate of low-skilled  workers  has risen over 
’ Wood  (1994) makes this argument. 
9 For evidence  on comparative  changes in wage inequality within the OECD,  see Freeman 
and Katz (1995). 8 
time.  In fact, only France,  Italy and Norway  show big rises in unemployment  among the least 
skilled relative  to more skilled workers.”  In other countries,  unemployment  among  all groups  has 
risen, so relative  unemployment  rates by skill remain largely constant.  In general,  European 
unemployment  seems more focused by age than by skill level.  Younger  workers  have experienced 
the biggest increases  in unemployment.  But this does not necessarily contradict  the unified 
theory.  Labor  market  protections  that make it harder of fire older workers  in Europe  may have 
pushed an undue burden of unemployment  onto younger  workers  of all skill levels, as companies 
try to cope with changing  competition  and changing product  demand. 
Finally, a growing  body of research has tried to directly test the extent to which direct 
changes in trade  or technology  feed through  to the labor market.”  At present,  this literature  is 
more extensive  for the United  States than for Europe,  and there is a need to do more cross- 
national  comparative  work  on these topics.  The evidence seems to suggest that  changing 
technology  has played a larger role than changing trade, although  there remain serious  problems 
in correctly  characterizing  technological  change and in developing  a fully satisfying  model  of how 
trade changes  flow through  the entire labor market. 
While there  is much we still don’t understand  about the extent to which U.S. and 
European  labor market  changes are linked together,  there appear to have been a series of demand 
shifts that  have affected many of the most industrialized nations.  Differences  in how labor 
markets in these nations  have responded  depends upon their institutional  structure.  Less 
lo Nickel1 and Bell (1995). 
l1 Recent  contributions  to this literature include Allen (1996) and Berman,  Bound  and 
Griliches (1994). regulated  labor markets,  particularly  the United States and the United Kingdom,  have experienced 
much greater  changes  in  l2  relative wages.  (  It is worth noting that o&  in the United  States have 
there been actual declines in real wages among workers.  In other countries  where  inequality  has 
grown,  it is because the wages of more skilled workers  have risen faster than the wages  of those 
at the bottom  of the wage distribution.)  Countries with centralized  labor bargaining  have been 
most effective  in maintaining  an unchanged  relative wage structure,  but a number of these 
economies  have instead faced very high and sustained unemployment  problems. 
9 
The demographics  of different nations also appear to matter for these labor market 
changes.  Some of the labor market differences across countries  can be explained by different  age 
patterns  in the population,  as well as by different patterns  of labor force entry and exit among 
younger  and older workers,  as well as among female workers. 
Social protection  programs have played a key role in offsetting  the effect of labor market 
changes on workers’  income and well-being.  Countries with more redistributive  programs  have 
spread the economic  costs of these changes more broadly within the economy.  In fact, there  is 
some evidence  that countries  with more extensive social assistance programs  are exactly those 
countries  where the increases in unemployment  are also spread more broadly  across workers  of 
different  skill levels.  This suggests that these countries  may have distributional  norms that  affect 
corporate  and public behavior,  beyond the explicit transfer systems that are in place.  (One small 
piece of evidence  in support  of this is the rising level of CEO salaries relative to other  workers 
within the firm in the United  States over the  198Os,  a pattern that is not mirrored  in European 
firms.)  Within the United  States, the costs of these economic  changes have been much more 
l2 Freeman  and Katz (1994) make this argument. 10 
highly concentrated  on a particular  group of workers,  with less relief provided  by public transfer 
programs. 
I don’t want to oversell the “unified theory”  approach  to understanding  the unemployment 
or wage  situation  in any one country.  Every industrialized country  has clearly faced its own 
unique  set of economic  and social forces over the past two decades, which have shaped the 
economic  reality  of its workers.  For instance, some countries  have chosen to pursue  strong 
macroeconomic  and monetary  policies to fight inflation, and this has affected their unemployment 
rates and their wage rates.  Other countries  have faced significant immigration  issues, which  has 
affected unemployment  and changed the distribution  ofjobs  and wages.  Each country  has it’s 
own peculiar  history.  But it remains a usef%l  exercise to stop asking what is different  about the 
U.S. and the various  European  experiences,  and to instead asking what is similar about  them. 
When this question  is asked, it becomes clear that there are related labor market  problems  facing 
both U.S. and European  policy makers. 
Policy  Implications 
In all countries,  changing labor markets have present major challenges to policy-makers. 
All countries  have faced increasing demands on their public assistance programs,  from workers 
facing either deteriorating  wages or long-term  unemployment.  This means greater  demands  on 
public budgets.  Countries  with extensive social welfare states have been most challenged,  as the 
burden of supporting  generous  redistributive  programs rises when the number of people  accessing 
those  programs  grows.  Sweden is only the most dramatic example of a European  country  that is 
being forced  to make significant cuts in it social assistance programs,  due to the economic 
problems  of providing  traditional  levels of support to a large number of unemployed  workers. 11 
There are many responses  to both the labor market problems and the public budget 
problems that  countries  have experienced.  The initial approach  taken by many nations  was simply 
to hope that these problems would go away and things would return to “normal.”  Unfortunately, 
but not  surprisingly,  this approach  failed.  The fundamental  economic  changes underlying  these 
economic  problems  are unlikely to reverse themselves and will probably  continue  in the 
foreseeable  future.  To the extent that part of the problem is due to growing  global economic 
competition  (particularly  increasing competition  from rapidly developing  nations),  this 
competition  will only continue  and may even accelerate  in certain markets.  To the extent  that  part 
of the problem  is due to the growth  of “smart” technologies  that privilege more skilled workers, 
most observers  believe these technological  shifts are still underway  in most industries. 
A second  possible response is to try and insulate a country’s  economies  from these 
economic  changes,  through  higher trade barriers or by trying to regulate  labor market  changes  and 
slow down the adoption  of new technologies.  Fortunately,  few countries  have chosen  this route, 
although  a vocal  political  minority  in all industrialized countries  continue  to advocate  this.  As 
economists  are famous for pointing  out (often with annoying frequency),  creating  barrier  to trade 
and barriers to economic  change can produce very negative long-run  effects, limiting  economic 
growth  and job  creation  and creating long run costs that are much greater  than the benefits  that 
such policies might produce  in the short run. 
This leaves only one good  alternative:  For governments  to confront  these problems  head- 
on, recognize  that they have no quick and easy solution, and plan in the long run for how to offset 
and reduce their labor market effects.  There is no single “silver bullet” to do this, and each 
country  must find an approach  that works within its own particular  set of political  and economic 12 
institutions.  The best answers, I believe, lie in utilizing a mix of ideas from both the U.S. and the 
European  experience. 
On the one hand, those who admire the flexibility of the U.S. labor market  have some 
good  arguments  in their favor.  Extensive limits on employee hiring and firing can seriously  limit 
an economy’s  ability to adopt to changing economic forces.  In economies  with extensive 
historical  labor regulations,  easing severance restrictions  and increasing the ability of firms to hire 
part-time  or temporary  labor are almost surely necessary changes. 
On the other  hand, along with flexibility must come a greater willingness  to redistribute 
the costs of that flexibility throughout  the economy,  rather than forcing  it to be borne  by 
particular  groups  of workers  facing extended unemployment  or falling wages.  U.S. policy 
makers have been far too  ready to shrug and say “That’s just the result of the market,”  in the face 
of massive loss of earning power among less-skilled workers.  There are two ways in which 
countries  need to offset the costs of ongoing  labor market changes, 
First, there  are a variety  of active labor market policies designed to subsidize or raise 
wages or which bring unemployed  workers back into jobs.  Many countries  have at least 
experimented  with expanded job  placement and training programs,  subsidies and tax incentives  for 
hiring disadvantaged  workers,  and public sector job  creation,  particularly  for the long-term 
unemployed  and for younger  workers  who may have dropped out of the labor market  entirely. 
Such programs  directly address some of the problems of low skills or inadequate  access to 
jobs.  Thus, they promise to “right” that which is wrong.  They also operate  to redistribute  some 
of the gains by “winners”  (those who maintain their jobs and/or experience  rising wages)  to the 
“losers”  (those  who become unemployed  or face declining wages.) There is plenty  of evidence 13 
that these programs  can have positive effects.13 
But it is important  to recognize  that such effects are typically  small. 
job  placement  programs  lead to large increases in future income, according 
Rarely  do training  or 
to most evaluations  of 
these programs.  In addition,  such programs make significant demands on the public sector.  Not 
only are they typically  quite costly, per participant  served, but they also require  substantial 
management  expertise.  Someone must actually run these programs,  locating jobs,  monitoring 
employers’  use of tax credits, identifying public sector job placements,  and so on.  In many cases, 
such policies  may be best operated  by the government,  in conjunction  with substantial  private 
sector  involvement  (where management expertise is often greater.)  Traditionally,  such programs 
have worked  best when run on a small scale for clearly targeted  groups. 
All of this suggests that  some mix of active labor market policies are an important  policy 
component  in most countries,  but they are rarely adequate as by themselves.  They must be 
combined with some on-going  redistribution  of income, supplementing  the wages of low-wage 
workers  or providing  income support for those who remain unemployed.  Active labor market 
policies  must be the first line of attack  -- workers  should be pushed into job  training, job  search 
and public job  programs  as quickly as the size of these programs will allow.  But given the 
realistic limits on active labor market policies, a reasonable social safety net needs to remain in 
place.  If this does not happen, countries will face very real long-term  consequences,  such as 
increases in the size of their underground  economies,  increasing crime, drug use, and family 
fragmentation  -- frequent  outcomes  when a share of the population  is excluded from mainstream 
labor markets,  and increasing  civic disconnection  and disorder. 
l3 For a summary of the U.S. evidence, see U.S. Department  of Labor  (1995) 14 
Such income  supplementation  can occur through  traditional  unemployment  and public 
assistance  subsidies, or can occur in more novel ways.  The Earned  Income  Tax Credit  in the 
United  States  subsidizes wages of low wage workers  and has been shown to increase  labor force 
participation  among those  initially out of the labor market.14 Public sector job  programs  are a way 
of supplementing  income while still encouraging  labor market activity.  Part-time  unemployment 
subsidies are used in some European  countries,  and subsidize involuntary  part-time  workers  with 
partial unemployment  payments. 
The appropriate  level of such subsidies is always a contentious  issue.  Because  of 
perceived  overwhelming  demand on their unemployment  and public assistance  budgets,  most 
industrialized  countries  have cut income transfers to some extent in recent years.  The United 
States has been in the midst of a debate about whether its social assistance  programs  are too 
generous  (particularly  in the face of high and sustained caseloads  over the early  1990s) for several 
years.  Other  countries  have implemented major changes in the unemployment  benefit  systems 
(which traditionally  provide  far more income support and redistribution  inEuropean  countries 
than in the United  States),  as well as some of their social assistance programs. 
Setting  limits on access to cash support may be a fiscal necessity, but if at all possible, 
those  limits should coincide  with the provision  of active labor market policies.  Time limits on 
unemployment  insurance  may usefully coincide with involvement  in job  search and training. 
Time limits on public assistance with no guarantee  of employment,  as have been recently  enacted 
in the United  States,  amounts to no more than wishful-thinking  public policy.  Given the realities 
of low-wage  labor markets,  many less skilled parents will face unemployment  and low wages that 
l4 Eissa and Lehman  (1996). 15 
make economic  survival extremely difficult without  some ongoing  external  support. 
The economic  changes in U.S. and European  labor markets have created  difficult 
problems  for these countries.  The link between these problems of declining wages  and high 
unemployment  and changes in global economic  forces suggest that there is little reason  to believe 
these problems  will reverse themselves  at any point in the decade ahead.  Declining  wages  and/or 
high unemployment  are going to be continuing  problems within the foreseeable  future.  Nations 
will also continue  to face difficult choices between active labor market policies,  redistributive 
programs  and government  budget costs. 
At present,  the United  States appears to be in the process of choosing  a route  whereby 
low-income  families are cut off even further from government  assistance,  in the name of deficit 
reduction  and budget balancing.  The recent welfare reforms aimed at low-income  families 
emphasize that the labor market is the only way out of poverty,  even as falling wages make fX- 
time work  less and less useful as an escape from poverty.  The long-term  consequences  of such 
policy changes,  when combined with the trends in wages, are unknown.  They have the potential 
to lead to increases  in class conflict,  in poverty,  and in a lost sense of opportunity  via mainstream 
employment. 
While many European  countries  are cutting their safety nets, most still maintain  far greater 
assistance  and redistribution  than the United States  Given a longer and stronger  commitment  to 
public redistribution  in the past, how far they will follow the United  States in cutting  back social 
assistance  in the long term is unclear.  Because the problem of long-term  unemployment  -- 
particularly  among younger  workers  -- has been evident for many years in these  countries,  there  is 
perhaps  more recognition  of the long-term  costs of this problem, as youth  simply drop out,  seeing 16 
no reason to make any effort to prepare for or look for work.  Unfortunately,  Europe  has found 
no effective  ways to lower youth  unemployment  rates, just  as the United  States has found  no 
effective ways to prevent  wage declines among the less skilled. 
There  are no obvious  answers to these problems in the short-run,  only ways to soften their 
effects.  Those  who favor U.S. labor markets as models of flexibility, adjusting  quickly to 
economic  changes  and thereby  providing the incentives for workers  to invest in new skills or 
change jobs  and relocate,  must also indicate how they propose  to deal with the substantial 
segment of the American working  population  that is facing permanently  lower wages and reduced 
incentives  to participate  in mainstream labor markets.  Those who favor the European  model that 
provides  more job  protection  and greater wage equality must indicate how they propose  to deal 
with the large number of long-term  unemployed  in these countries.  A better  response  is not view 
policy as a choice between’two  opposing  models, but to try and meld some of the best parts of the 
flexible U.S. private  labor market with an effective set of active labor market  and social protection 
policies. 17 
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